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2 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 13, in J. S. Mill, On Liberty and other writings (Stefan Collini ed.
1989) (emphasis added).
3 See infra notes
1
THE HOLLOWNESS OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE
Steven D. Smith1
Among the various instruments in the toolbox of liberalism, surely one of the most popular– and
the most effectively used–  has been what is often called “the harm principle.”  Presented by John Stuart
Mill as “one very simple principle . . . entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control . . .,” the principle holds that “the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is . . . to prevent harm to others.”2
Even its supporters (including Mill himself) have typically been less stringent than Mill’s
absolutist language might lead us to expect, and hence have sometimes allowed for limited restrictions
on liberty–  paternalistic restrictions, for example3– not authorized by the harm principle.  Still, the
principle has been and continues to be invoked frequently and with powerful effect in debates on a
range of issues from prohibitions on obscenity to regulations of marijuana to motorcycle helmet and
seatbelt requirements to the hot button controversy of the moment: same-sex marriage.  Though the
principle’s proponents sometimes argue that it has been effectively embraced in recent constitutional
2
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4 See infra notes
5 415 A.2d 47, 50-51 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1980).
6 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 n. 11 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff’d in Cruzan v.
Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
7 In the matter of Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W. 3d 317, 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Mill for the proposition that “[a]utonomy, an adult person's right to live life consistent with his or
her personal values, is one of the bedrock principles of a free society”).
8 Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 373 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1999) (quoting Mill’s harm principle,
and suggesting that the principle is embodied in both the Montana and United States constitutions).
9 Morin v. MGH Institute of Health Professions, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 417, 417 (Mass. Super.
2002); Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993).
2
decisions, 4 in fact the harm principle has not officially or explicitly been adopted into American
constitutional law.  Nonetheless, its influence is discernible, not only in the judicial sphere but in
academic and popular discourse as well.
Courts have occasionally declared the harm principle to be part of our fundamental law.  In
Commonwealth v. Bonadio,5 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the “concepts
underlying our view of the police power . . . were once summarized . . . by the great philosopher, John
Stuart Mill, in his eminent and apposite work, On Liberty (1859)”; and the court proceeded to quote
extensively from Mill, beginning with his statement of the harm principle.  In the state court decision
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, the Missouri Supreme
Court noted that “courts regularly turn to J. S. Mill for inspiration” and went on to quote with approval
Mill’s formulation of the harm principle.6  More recently, state courts have explicitly invoked Mill and
the harm principle as providing the legal rule for issues concerning the appointment of a conservator for
an elderly person,7 abortion regulations,8 decisions regarding medical treatment,9 and prohibitions of
3
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10 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1993).
11 For example, in the recent case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 2003), invalidating a state law denying marriage to same-sex couples, the
court declared that the law could be upheld only if it “serves a legitimate purpose in a rational way.” Id.
at 960.  The state responded by asserting various ostensible functions served by the law: it preserved a
favorable setting for procreation, the state said, or it promoted the upbringing of children in optimal
circumstances, or it saved resources by excluding same-sex couples from valuable but costly benefits. 
Though a 4-3 majority found them too flimsy to support the restriction, these are interests that, if found
to be genuine, could readily support claims that same-sex marriage would cause “harm”– harm to
children, or monetary harm.
By contrast, the various opinions in the case pay virtually no attention to what might seem to be
the obvious basis of laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples– namely, the traditional view that
homosexual marriage is morally wrong.  The court acknowledged in its statement of the background to
the case that “[m]any people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage
should be limited to the union of one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral.” 
Id. at 948.  But neither the court nor the state itself appeared to regard this sociological fact as
providing a possible justification for the law. A hazy version of the morality rationale appears near the
end of the majority opinion, only to receive a brusque, one-sentence dismissal that seems only obliquely
responsive to the claim.   Id. at 967.  Tellingly, even that negligible discussion of the issue was a
response to amicus briefs, not to any argument advanced by the state itself.
12 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
3
homosexual sodomy.10  And the harm principle might in fact be working behind the scenes even when it
is not explicitly invoked: it might influence litigators and judges to justify challenged laws on the basis of
concrete interests whose frustration can easily be depicted as a kind of “harm” instead of relying on
more obvious but less clearly “harm”-based rationales.11
The United States Supreme Court has not explicitly conferred legal status on the harm principle. 
Nonetheless, commentators and occasionally Justices themselves sometimes argue that the principle has
been silently at work in the cases.  In  Barnes v. Glen Theatre,12 for example, in which a fragmented
Court narrowly upheld a “public indecency” statute applied to prevent nude dancing in adults-only
establishments, Justice Scalia colorfully accused the four dissenting justices of embracing the principle
4
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13  Id. at 575:
Perhaps the dissenters believe that “offense to others” ought to be the only reason for
restricting nudity in public places generally, but there is no basis for thinking that our
society has ever shared that Thoreauvian “you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-
does-not-injure-someone-else” beau ideal– much less for thinking that it was written into
the Constitution.  The purpose of Indiana’s nudity law would be violated, I think, if
60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to
one another, even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd.  Our society
prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they
harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, contra bonos
mores,” i.e., immoral.
14 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
15 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in Cato
Supreme Court Review 2002-2003.  But see Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup:
Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition,
88 Minn. L. Rev. 1312 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence does not constitutionalize libertarianism).  See
also Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 429, 486-91
(2004) (discussing view that police power extends only to activities that cause harm).
16 See Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).
4
(though Scalia attributed the principle to Thoreau rather than Mill).13  And some commentators have
argued that the recent case of Lawrence v. Texas,14 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas
law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, effectively constitutionalized the harm principle.15
If the influence of the harm principle in judicial contexts is most often tacit and hard to
corroborate, its adoption in the academy is more explicit and demonstrable.  The principle received a
huge boost as a result of the famous debate about the enforcement of morals that began in the 1960s
with an exchange between the English judge Lord Patrick Devlin16 and H. L. A. Hart, the Oxford legal
5
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17 In particular, Hart criticized Mill’s rejection of paternalism.  H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and
Morality 32-33 (1963):
. . . Mill carried his protest against paternalism to lengths that may now appear to be
fantastic.  He cites the example of restrictions on the sale of drugs, and criticises them as
interferences with the liberty of the would-be purchaser rather than with that of the seller. 
No doubt if we no longer sympathise with this criticism this is due, in part, to a general
decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best, and to an increased
awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an
apparently free choice or to consent.  Choices may be made or consent given without
adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely transitory
desires; or in various predicaments when the judgment is likely to be clouded; or under
inner psychological compulsion;; or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be
susceptible of proof in a law court.  Underlying Mill’s extreme fear of paternalism there
perhaps is a conception of what a normal human being is like which now seems not to
correspond to the facts.
18 Robert George, Making Men Moral 49 (1993).  Jeffrie Murphy remembers that the Hart-
Devlin debate was “one of the primary topics being discussed– perhaps the main topic–“ in the field of
philosophy of law.  Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 73, 74 (1995).
19 George observes that “[m]any, . . . perhaps even most, think that Hart carried the day . . . “
George, supra note   at 65.  Joel Feinberg reports that it is “fair to say” that Devlin’s position has been
“discredited.”  Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 136 (1990). That verdict is contestable, I think,
but this is not the place to revisit the matter.
5
philosopher and a self-acknowledged proponent of Mill’s position (with modifications,17 of course).  It
was, Robert George recalls, “one of the most remarkable debates in the history of English-speaking
jurisprudence.”18   And the crucial fact is that (at least according to the received understanding) Hart
decisively won and Devlin lost the debate.19  The standard verdict has ongoing importance because the
debate plausibly could be, and was, viewed as a debate about the harm principle, so that Devlin’s
supposed drubbing can be taken to signify the triumph of that principle.  Thus, Bernard Harcourt
observes that 
over the course of the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, Mill’s famous sentence began to
dominate the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement of morality.  Harm became
6
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 17 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art17
20 Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109,
131 (1999).
21 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (1984); Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (1985); Joel
Feinberg, Harm to Self (1986); Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (1990).
22  See generally Feinberg, Harm to Self (1984).  Compare Hart, supra note  ; Cass R.
Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159
(2003).
23 See Mill, supra note   at 98 (observing that “there are many acts which, . . . if done publicly,
are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may
rightfully be prohibited”).  See generally Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (1985). 
24 Vincent Blasi described Feinberg’s opus as “[a]mong the most balanced, comprehensive,
and rigorous treatises of recent times.”  Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First
Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 611, 619 (1992).  Kent
Greenawalt appraised the project as a “nuanced and exhaustive treatment of the subject.”  Kent
Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 710, 711 (1995).  See also
Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Freedom, and Community, 100 Ethics 368, 368 (1990) (Feinberg
“argues brilliantly” for his positions and his work is characterized by “sensitive and precise conceptual
analysis”); Robert P. George, Moralistic Liberalism and Legal Moralism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1415, 1415
(1990) (review essay) (Feinberg’s work “a model of clear, rigorous, and fairminded philosophical
6
the critical principle used to police the line between law and morality within Anglo-
American philosophy of law.  Most prominent theorists who participated in the debate
either relied on the harm principle or made favorable reference to the argument.20
Perhaps the most impressive defense of the harm principle occurred in a four-volume work by
the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg that has become an oft-cited jurisprudential classic.21  Like others in
the liberal tradition, Feinberg was not quite a “harm principle” absolutist: unlike Hart and some other
liberals, he opposed paternalism,22 but he accepted a hint from Mill in allowing for limited restrictions on
liberty to prevent serious offense to others.23  In the main, though, Feinberg’s opus amounted to a
massive sympathetic exposition of the harm principle, and it generated lavish praise even from scholars
who disagreed with Feinberg on important points.24
7
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argument”).
25 See infra Part I.B.
26 See James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Liberty Fund ed. 1993). 
7
Unlike some other darlings of legal and political philosophy, however (such as, arguably,
“public reason” and some of its implications), the harm principle is not merely or even mainly an
academic phenomenon.  On the contrary, much of its power derives, I will argue, from its resonance
with views and adages that pervade popular political discussions.  Although terminology may vary, you
are as likely to hear the harm principle invoked in an popular discussion of obscenity or seat belt
requirements or abortion as in an academic discussion.25
Because of its widespread appeal and its apparent significance for a range of current and highly
contested issues (such as abortion, pornography, and same-sex marriage), the harm principle deserves
continuing and close scrutiny.  Is the principle as strong and sound as it often seems to be?  Should it
play a significant or even decisive role in resolving the issues of the day?
Contrary to prevailing liberal wisdom, I will argue in this essay that it should not: on the
contrary, our public debates about liberty would be greatly enhanced if the harm principle were
discarded outright.  In taking this position, I do not mean to join up with the principle’s renowned (or
notorious) critics– namely, Lord Devlin and his nineteenth-century predecessor,  James Fitzjames
Stephen26– who argued (or at least are taken to have argued) that the harm principle is mistaken and
that society should sometimes prohibit immoral conduct even when the conduct is not discernibly
harmful.  Such arguments make it seem that the harm principle is substantial and contested– that it has
definite content and that this content is accepted by some and rejected by others.
8
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27 My argument is quite similar in this respect to Peter Westen’s famous criticism of “The Empty
Idea of Equality.”  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).  Equality,
Westen contended, is an empty and purely formal principle: it simply means that like cases should be
treated alike.  No one really disagrees with that proposition: the real disagreements are over which
cases are alike, or over what substantive criteria should be employed to determine whether cases are
or are not alike.  So when the notion of “equality” is deployed as if it were capable of supporting some
substantive conclusion, we can be quite confident that intellectual mischief is occurring.  Westen’s
criticism provoked a variety of responses, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Anthony D’Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 600 (1983), and we need not consider here whether the criticism was valid with respect
to the principle of “equality.”  The present relevance of Westen’s argument, rather, is that it illustrates
the kind of criticism made in this argument.
8
But I think this description does not get the matter quite right.  My argument will be, rather, that
upon closer examination the harm principle turns out to be not mistaken, exactly, but hollow– and hence
mischievous.  It is an empty vessel, alluring and even irresistible but without any inherent legal or
political content, into which advocates can pour whatever substantive views and values they happen to
favor.  Vessel and contents can then easily become confounded– with pernicious effects.
Perhaps the major problem that results is that advocates are tempted to advance their values
and views not on their substantive merits, but rather by promoting the vessel, or the packaging.  And
like the harm principle itself, that temptation has proven irresistible– not merely to the office party
debater or the talk show host, but to sophisticated philosophers as well, notably including the
principle’s most articulate proponents: Mill and Feinberg.  To shift metaphors, the evil that attaches to
the harm principle is that it promotes free riding.  By tying their views to an irresistible but substantively
vacuous principle, advocates try to sell positions that accordingly are not required to (and might not be
able to) earn their own way.27
This essay develops this criticism in two parts.  Part I explains that the harm principle has
9
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proven to be virtually irresistible because of two important virtues: its simplicity, and its resonance with
intuitions, familiar adages, and common axioms about the purpose and function of government that
pervade the American political community.  Part II considers the question “What is harm?” and argues
that the question confronts liberal thinkers with a dilemma.  The harm principle’s appeal, I argue, arises
from a generic and subjective conception of harm, but that conception also renders the principle useless
for its intended purpose– protecting liberty.  Conversely, the principle can be made serviceable by
adopting more technical and objective conceptions of what counts as harm.  But these conceptions
effectively empty the principle of independent content, making its content instead derivative of some
independent vision or theory of government and the good life; they thereby sacrifice the simplicity and
resonance that make the principle attractive in the first place.
Part II goes on to argue that proponents of the principle have, in effect, cheated: they have
adopted artificially narrow conceptions of harm in order to secure their desired conclusions, but have
continued to rely on the more generic and subjective senses of harm to do the work of persuasion. 
Consequently, the harm principle has served not to clarify discussion and disagreement but instead to
promote obfuscation and equivocation.
I.  The Irresisibility of the Harm Principle
For present purposes, we can analyze the harm principle into two components– and then
bracket one of those components.  The harm principle holds (a) that the only justification (with perhaps
a few grudging qualifications) for coercively restricting liberty is to prevent harm and (b) that the harm
that may justify such restrictions must be harm to others.  Component (b)– the anti-paternalism
10
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28 See supra notes
29 See notes
30  But cf. Richards v. State, 743 S.W. 2d 747, 751 (Tex. App.1987) (Levy, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mill’s statement of the “harm to others” principle and adding that “if we uphold the authority of
the State to punish one’s failure to use a seat-belt, we are one more step on our way to an Orwellian
society in which the State can punish merely for smoking cigarettes, for not brushing one’s teeth, or for
being foolish”).
31 Mill, supra note    at 13.
10
component– has been defended by Mill, Feinberg, and others; but as noted it has been questioned or
rejected by others in the liberal Millian tradition (notably H. L. A. Hart28), and it has seemingly been
less influential than the core principle itself in debates about legal issues.  As noted, there is an eminently
contestable but at least a plausible case that the basic harm principle– component (a)– should be or
possibly even has been incorporated into constitutional law.29  By contrast, the case for reading an anti-
paternalism restriction into the Constitution seems much more tenuous.30  This essay, therefore, will
focus on the basic harm principle, bracketing the anti-paternalism corollary.
So simplified, the harm principle seems virtually (or perhaps actually) irresistible.  Its allure
arises from two features.  First, the principle is (or at least it presents itself as) a “very simple principle,”
as Mill observed31.  Second, the principle’s animating idea– we might call it simply the “no harm”
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32 See infra Part II.  And cf. Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note   at 25 (observing that “as
many of his critics have since pointed out, neither Mill’s principle nor the principles he rejects are simple
and unitary”).
33 Cf. Harcourt, supra note   at  (“[The harm principle offered a bright-line rule.  A rule that was
simple to apply.  A rule that was simply applied.”).
34 Jorge Menezes Oliveira observes that “Mill does certainly not pretend that the [harm]
principle is a sufficient condition for legitimate use of coercion against individuals; it specifies only a
necessary condition . . . . It tells us when we may restrict liberty, not when we ought to.”  Jorge
Menezes Oliveira, Harm and Offence in Mill’s Conception of Liberty,
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1534/JDG/oliveira.pdf, at p. 3   See also Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra
note   at 10.
35 See Mill, supra note   at 76.
11
Start with the feature of simplicity.  Appearances can be deceiving,32 but at least on its face the
harm principle seems to live up to this part of Mill’s advertising.33  If your actions do or at least may
cause harm, government has the authority to restrict such actions. The harm principle does not entail, of
course, that government must restrict all conduct that causes harm: whether restrictions are appropriate
depends on a consideration of relevant factors, such as the costs and benefits of restrictions and the
value of liberty to engage even in potentially harmful conduct.34  Restriction of particular harmful
conduct may or may not be prudent or expedient, therefore, but it is legitimate; it lies within
government’s “jurisdiction,”35 so to speak.  Conversely, if your conduct does not cause harm, then
government should leave you alone: it has no “jurisdiction,” or no legitimate grounds for interfering.
This apparent simplicity makes the harm principle seem almost tailor-made for judicial use. 
Judges, after all, are supposed to resolve cases not by doing ad hoc cost-benefit analyses of each
individual dispute, but rather by applying “law”– rules or principles of a majestic generality.  Especially
in the realm of constitutional law, it has become almost axiomatic that courts are supposed to act only
12
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36 The classic expression is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
37 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 n. 11 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff’d in Cruzan v.
Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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on the basis of “principles.”36  Moreover, in the American constitutional system with its commitments to
separation of powers and to democracy, judges are not supposed to usurp the role of legislatures. 
These are mere truisms.   And a “simple,” sweeping principle like Mill’s caters to these judicial
limitations.  If conduct causes harm, then absent some other constitutional obstacle it is for the
legislature– not the courts– to make the complex cost-benefit or prudential judgments needed to decide
whether to regulate that conduct.  Courts can exult in the deference they give to the elected branches. 
Conversely, if conduct does not cause harm, then it is none of the legislature’s business: the “liberty”
protected by the Constitution has been improperly infringed, and it is the courts’ job to say so.  So it
should not be surprising if at least some “courts regularly turn to J. S. Mill [and the harm principle] for
inspiration.”37 
But it is not only judges who might be expected to feel the allure of the harm principle’s
apparent simplicity.  Academic theorists may be attracted as well.  After all, theorists (at least when
they are acting as theorists) are not immersed in the nitty gritty, hurly burly doings and disputations of
life, but rather are seeking some more detached position from which to examine and explain and, if they
are normative theorists (including law professors), to criticize and prescribe.  Consequently, in thinking
and writing about the proper limits on government’s legitimate authority to regulate abortion or
obscenity or drugs, academic theorists cannot just be pragmatic moral accountants who do a cost-
benefit analysis of every controversy that comes along: they need to be able make and apply more
13
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38 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note  at 16-17.
39 Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
13
general precepts from within the quiet of their offices or the measured calm of the seminar room or
lecture hall.  And to do this, they need a relatively “simple” principle or set of principles not requiring
careful, case-by-case field work for every messy question that arises.  The harm principle’s apparent
simplicity is thus a strong recommendation for employment in academic contexts.  It seems to permit the
kinds of judgments– and the kinds of recommendations to courts– that detached academicians are
competent to make.
Joel Feinberg provides a nice illustration of the point.  In his ambitious study of the moral limits
of the criminal law, Feinberg considers a host a questions, both general and specific, about the
legitimate limits of government coercion, and offers a variety of conclusions and prescriptions both
general and specific.  Yet Feinberg acknowledges at the outset that as an academic philosopher his
main contribution must consist of “conceptual clarification.”38   Hence, his study will “not probe deeply
into the facts or discuss, for example, the varieties of drug addiction, or the effects of pornography on
children, or the degree of physical protection provided by seat belts . . ..”  Nonetheless, the study’s
“aim is to be practical anyway”39– to discuss and even to make recommendations on just these kinds
of matters.  But without “prob[ing] deeply into the facts,” that practical aim could be accomplished, it
seems, only with the aid of some fairly simple principle or set of principles whose application to issues
does not demand any heavy reliance on empirical research.
Of course, it is not only judges and theorists but also ordinary citizens who argue about the
propriety of restrictions on liberty.  Should motorcyclists be required to wear helmets?  Should the use
14
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of marijuana be prohibited?  What about abortion?  The right to die?  The instances are endless, and
the issues can be vitally interesting to us all– and hence they are the subject of countless conversations
at social gatherings or lunchtime discussions or radio call-in shows.  And like the theoreticians and
judges, most of us typically cannot claim to have carefully researched all of the empirical dimensions of
these diverse issues.  Maybe you have methodically studied the pros and cons of motorcycle helmets or
seatbelts, but I haven’t, and neither has anyone I know.  So in order to express an opinion on such
matters, we might naturally wish for criteria whose application do not require a Ph.D in a particular area
of social science.  Mill’s “very simple principle” meets this need– or at least it seems to.
B. Resonance
Thinking about how the harm principle works in ordinary conversations also suggests a second
feature of the principle that can make it nearly irresistible: the basic precept animating Mill’s proposal
seems almost self-evidently true.  It resonates with intuitions most of us have, and with adages that are
standard fare in everyday exchanges, and with familiar wisdom about the role of and justification for
government.
 Thus, the “no harm” precept expresses an intuition most of us have had from childhood.  If I
really want to do something, and if I’m not harming anyone, then what possible reason could Daddy
have for telling me I can’t do it?   And we carry this intuition into adulthood.  “What harm would it
do?,” we ask, or “Who [sic] would it hurt?”
A similar intuition is often expressed as a “none of your business” appeal: what doesn’t injure or
affect anybody else is “none of their business.”   The intuition is powerful and widespread, and though
15
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40 See, e.g., Mill, supra note   at 86 (arguing that “with the personal tastes and self regarding
concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere”); id. at 87 (“intrusively pious” persons
should “mind their own business”); Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note    At 9 (conduct not covered
by coercion-legitimating principles is “not the business of the state”) (emphasis in original).
41 State v. Parson, 447 S.W.2d 543, 546 (W. V. Sup Ct. App. 1994).  See also United States
v. Joseph, 37 M. J. 392, 397 (1993) (“According to ancient legal maxim, one's liberty to swing one's
arms stops where another's nose begins.”); Boissonneault v. Mason, 221 N.W.2d 393, 393 (Mich.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (invoking “the now classic observation that your right to swing your arm ends at the tip
of my nose”).
15
the phrasing may seem inelegant, in fact the eminent thinkers who have addressed the issue have often
resorted precisely to that “none of their business” language to convey the point.40  Though it can be
abused, freedom in itself is a good thing– who doubts this?– so as long as a person is exercising her
freedom in ways that causes no harm, why is it anybody else’s business (including government’s) to tell
her she can’t?
The “no harm” precept also resonates with an adage that all of us must have heard a thousand
times, beginning in grade school or before: we could call this the “somebody else’s nose” adage. 
“Everyone must understand,” as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals put it, “that his right to
swing his arm ends at the other chap's nose.”41   The inculcation is familiar.  The teacher tells a third
grader on the playground to stop doing something that is bothering or threatening other students.  The
obstreperous student complains: “Why can’t I?  It’s a free country, isn’t it?”  And the teacher patiently
explains that freedom is not unqualified.  “You have the right to swing your arm, Johnny, but only up to
the point where it runs into somebody else’s nose: at that point your freedom ends.”  The harm principle
and the “somebody else’s nose” adage seem nicely congenial, if not virtually identical.
In slightly more dignified terms, government is often conceived in the American political tradition
16
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43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 104 (Am. ed. 1950) (1651). 
44 See Mill, supra note    At 75 (asserting that “society is not founded on a contract, and . . . no
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and eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers that just government must have the consent of the
governed, he differs . . . in utterly rejecting the idea that we should think of society as based upon a
‘social contract’.”).
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as the product of a social contract that extricated us from a figurative “state of nature” in which we
imaginatively lived (or would live) before (or without) the institution of government.42  The state of
nature had its attractions-- there was no official authority to boss us around– but it also had drawbacks. 
In particular, there were no officials and no police to prevent other people from doing whatever they
wanted to do to us: hence, life could be “nasty, brutish, and short.”43  So we formed a government, the
familiar story says, in order to remedy this deficiency, preserving as much of our erstwhile liberty as
possible while providing a mechanism to prevent us from injuring each other.  From this picture it seems
to follow that government may step in to prevent some citizens from harming others: that is why we
formed government in the first place.  Conversely, if someone wants to do something that does not
injure or affect others, then it seems that government’s commission– its reason for being– is not
implicated; so the earlier rule of freedom should remain in force.
For those who object to the metaphors of states of nature and social contracts,44 the same idea
can be expressed in less figurative terms.  We might simply say that the purpose of government is to
protect and promote human welfare, or perhaps “human flourishing.”  After all, something like that
17
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purpose seems to be the reason why we pay taxes and submit to government, doesn’t it?  Freedom to
choose and act is surely part of human flourishing.  And it seems to follow almost inexorably that if a
person wants to do some action that will bring her pleasure or satisfaction or benefit, and if this action
will cause no harm to anyone, then government will diminish human welfare rather than enhancing it by
prohibiting the person from engaging in this harmless conduct.
C. Is the Harm Principle Too Powerful?
In short, the precept that animates the harm principle seems virtually irresistible.  Resonating
powerfully with familiar intuitions and adages and political theories, the basic idea seems almost self-
evidently sound.  H. L. A. Hart nicely made just this sort of appeal to the apparently self-evident quality
of the harm principle:
[A] very great difference is apparent between inducing persons through fear of
punishment to abstain from actions which are harmful to others, and inducing them to
abstain from actions which deviate from accepted morality but harm no one. . . .
[W]here there is no harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be protected, . . . it
is difficult to understand the assertion that conformity . . . is a value worth pursuing,
notwithstanding the sacrifice of freedom which it involves.45
It is difficult to understand indeed!  The harm principle is powerful– too powerful, perhaps. 
The lack of justification for restricting conduct that some people want to engage in and that harms no
one seems so obvious that it provokes a suspicion: does anyone really disagree?   Could it be that,
contrary to the prevailing assumption, everyone accepts the harm principle after all?46  Perhaps
18
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 17 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art17
18
everyone agrees with Mill’s basic idea– which would be a misfortune not a triumph for Mill and his
followers, because in that case the harm principle might no longer serve to distinguish the positions
favored by the Millians from those favored by their opponents.
The suspicion forces us to consider an obvious question that we have thus far tacitly deferred:
What is “harm” anyway?
II. What is “Harm”?  The Liberal Dilemma
So, what do we mean when we say that government should act only to prevent “harm”?  The
question confronts us with a dilemma.  I will preview the dilemma here and then try to elaborate on it.
One alternative would be to understand “harm” in a generic and what we may call “subjective”
sense.  We might, in other words, defer largely to everyday usage and to individuals’ own evaluations: if
people sincerely believe and report that they are “harmed” by some occurrence, they are.  As we will
see, this broad and subjective approach can be expressed by understanding “harm” in utilitarian terms.
In the alternative, we might instead try to use the term in a more technical and normative sense. 
Individuals’ sincere reports that they have been “harmed” in some way would not be conclusive:
instead, we would need to examine claims of injury reflectively, perhaps with the aid of some theory of
human interests, in order to decide whether the reported injuries count as cognizable “harms” or not.
Both possibilities– the generic and subjective approach, and the technical and normative
approach-- are open to us.  And the resulting dilemma is this: the features that make the harm principle
so irresistible– its simplicity, and its resonant or truistic quality– attach to and grow out of the generic
and subjective understanding of “harm.”  But this understanding would also render the harm principle
19
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wholly unsuitable for achieving its central purpose of limiting government and protecting liberty. 
Conversely, we can make the principle more useful for liberal purposes by defining “harm” in a more
crafted or technical sense: but in doing so we sacrifice the principle’s intuitive appeal.
So, how have Mill and his descendants resolved this dilemma?  The answer is less than
edifying.  To be blunt, they have equivocated.  They have tried to have it both ways.  Millian liberals
have acknowledged that generic and subjective understanding of harm would subvert the liberal
purposes of the harm principle, and so they have proceeded to refine the concept in various ways– to
make it more technical and normative.  But having made the desired refinements, they have nonetheless
proceeded to trade rhetorically– tacitly, perhaps, but rampantly– on the undifferentiated and subjective
sense of the term to carry themselves and their readers to their desired conclusions.
A. The Generic and Subjective Approach to Harm
The present question, once again, is “What is ‘harm’?”  And in answering this question, we
might defer to ordinary usage and to subjective evaluations: if people sincerely report that they have
been “harmed” by some occurrence, they have been.  This approach seems nicely compatible with
what Joel Feinberg sometimes calls “the spirit of the harm principle”47: after all, a proposal designed to
make room for individual choices and beliefs seemingly ought to respect individuals’ judgments about
what does and does not cause them “harm.”
1. The utilitarian conceptions
20
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One way of implementing this generic and subjective approach to harm would use a utilitarian
framework to decide what counts as harm.  Mill himself suggested that his proposal in On Liberty was
offered on purely utilitarian assumptions.48  Utilitarianism, however, has no single or canonical
formulation; rather it has become a broad umbrella for a family of ethical theories, of which Mill’s own
version seems somewhat idiosyncratic. 49  For our purposes, it is enough that by drawing upon the
remarks at the beginning of Mill’s discussion in Utilitarianism together with the writings of his
predecessor Bentham, we can extract two slightly different versions, either of which can supply a
conception of “harm” that seems congruent with everyday understandings.
The most familiar formulation, endorsed by Bentham and recited at the outset of his book by
Mill, understands utilitarianism as a position favoring the maximization of happiness understood in terms
of pleasure and the absence of pain. Bentham had declared that the correct moral principle “approves
or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question,” and he had understood
“happiness” in terms of those “sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.”50  Mill at least appeared to
concur:
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
21
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happiness.  By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.51
On these premises, it would seem, “harm” might naturally be understood as pain– or, more
accurately, as pain or the deprivation of pleasure.  So my conduct harms you if it causes you pain or if it
deprives you of some pleasure you would otherwise have enjoyed.  This conception of harm is subject-
based in the sense that if you report (sincerely) that you experience pain because of some action or
state of affairs, then you have suffered harm.
A slightly different version of utilitarianism would focus not directly on pleasure/pain as the
central desideratum but rather on the satisfaction or frustration of preferences.  A page after asserting
that pleasure and pain are the basis of right and wrong, Mill casually shifted to the vocabulary of
preference.52  The shift was calculated, it seems: Mill was concerned to justify the satisfaction of “higher
pleasures” over lower ones, and even to justify valuing subjective dissatisfaction suffered by someone
living according to his higher or intellectual nature over the coarser pleasures experienced by baser or
more vulgar souls.  Contrary to Bentham’s well-known dictum, Mill did not agree that pushpin
(substitute poker, or pornography, or professional wrestling?) should be preferred to poetry if more
people think pushpin is fun and poetry is a bore.  “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied,” Mill famously insisted; “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”53  Mill’s
nobler (and perhaps less democratic) predilections are difficult to square with a hedonic utilitarianism
22
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from a straightforwardly subjective utilitarianism– to approval of “the intrinsic superiority of the higher
[pleasures].”  Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
55 Since people usually prefer pleasure over pain, it seems that the “pleasure/pain” and
“preference” versions of utilitarianism (with their corollary understandings of “harm”) would often lead
to the same conclusions.  But they might diverge in some situations.  If I am a masochist, for instance,
and accordingly prefer to be in pain, then the first version of utilitarianism suggests that you act morally
by not inflicting pain on me; the second version implies that the moral course would be to indulge my
preference for pain.
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emphasizing mere “pleasure” as the ultimate good, but refocusing on “preferences” seemed more
promising: that is because Mill thought that “competent judges”54 would in fact prefer and choose
“higher” pleasures over baser ones, and would prefer to be a morose Socrates rather than a contented
pig.
Using a utilitarianism oriented to preferences rather than pleasure, we would understand “harm”
not in terms of inflicting pain but rather in terms of frustrating preferences.  I harm you, it would seem, if
I act in a way that prevents you from obtaining something you would prefer to have, or that brings
about a state of affairs different from what you regard as the preferable state of affairs that would
prevail if I acted differently.  Again, this conception of harm is subject-based: if you report (sincerely)
that your preferences have been frustrated, then you have suffered harm.55  
Whichever of these alternatives we might choose, these utilitarian versions of “harm” preserve
that principle’s attractive features of simplicity and of conveying an idea that seems almost self-evidently
true.  Suppose we opt for the “pleasure/pain” version.  Then the harm principle will mean that it is
23
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illegitimate for government to restrict my conduct except to prevent me from inflicting pain on others56
or depriving them of pleasure.  That idea seems simple enough, at least as an abstract matter, and it also
seems intuitively attractive.  If I want to do something (perhaps because I think it will bring me
pleasure57), and the thing I want to do will not cause anyone else pain or deprive anyone of pleasure,
then what good reason could government have for stopping me?  No doubt some caveats and
refinements might be needed, but the powerful appeal of the basic idea is apparent.
Or suppose we adopt the “preference” version.  Now the harm principle means that
government can restrict my freedom only to prevent me from acting in ways that frustrate other
people’s preferences– that impose on them states of affairs that they do not prefer.  Again, the basic
idea seems both straightforward and attractive.
In this vein, the philosopher Richard Arneson argues that “a plausible liberal doctrine should
incorporate a utilitarian value theory.”58   And he explains the rationale for this utilitarian approach: “[I]n
deciding on state policy, why should we care about anything except what will help make people’s lives
go best according to their own personal values?”59
24
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 17 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art17
60 For a similar though somewhat more elaborate example, see Feinberg, Harmless
Wrongdoing, supra note   at 57-60.
24
2. Nullifying the harm principle
So these two familiar and commonsensical versions of utilitarianism both supply conceptions of
“harm” that preserve the harm principle’s simplicity and truistic quality.  Unfortunately, these
conceptions also render the principle incapable of protecting liberty, which of course was the whole
reason for proposing the principle in the first place.   Any sort of conduct to which some people object
will inflict pain of various sorts and will interfere with the satisfaction of some people’s preferences– 
and hence will be within the realm of conduct that government may permissibly decide whether or not
to regulate.
Take a common example– one that seems to present the sort of issue liberal theorists have
wanted the harm principle to address.60  Suppose I live in a community in which “Moral Majority”
types are numerous and wield considerable political influence.  The community as a whole thus tends to
favor rigorous restrictions on materials that residents regard as obscene or pornographic.  As it
happens, I am a solid citizen with a family and a steady job, but one who happens on occasion to enjoy
watching hard-core, XXX films in my living room.  I watch these films alone, or sometimes with a few
adult friends– law faculty colleagues, perhaps– who have been fully advised about the nature of the
materials and have freely chosen to partake. (After particularly grueling and inane faculty meetings, we
find these gatherings the best way to “loosen up” and recover our sanity.)  But although these viewings
are as private as my friends and I can possibly make them (we keep the volume down and make sure
to close the curtains), they transgress the community’s anti-obscenity ordinance, which has no “private
25
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viewing” exception.  So what I view as nosy neighbors complain, and the local authorities move to
enforce the ordinance against me.
Naturally, I resent this invasion of my freedom.  So long as I watch these films strictly in private,
and so long as no one except fully informed and consenting adults participates, what business is it of the
community (I ask indignantly) to tell me I can’t do this?  I invoke Mill: the community has no right to
restrict my freedom, I protest, so long as I am not harming anyone.
The city council responds, though, that at least according to the utilitarian conceptions of harm,
I am harming other people, in a variety of ways.  How?, I ask, and the council obliges by explaining
two obvious ways in which I am, or at least may plausibly be thought to be, causing harm.  These forms
of harm will not elicit my sympathy, of course, and on balance they may not warrant restricting my
liberty.  Liberals– and others-- have typically treated them with derision.  But whether or not they
deserve this treatment, the crucial point is that they are real and perfectly genuine forms of harm
according to the utilitarian conceptions.
First, and most obviously, the knowledge that I am (or may be) watching XXX films in my
home causes emotional distress to all those citizens who view my practice with abhorrence.  Millian
liberals will surely respond, of course, that this is not the kind of harm they had in mind.  We can
concede the point, and we can further concede that it would be ill-advised to permit government to
restrict freedom just to avoid psychic distress to officious neighbors.  But the immediate point is simply
that I (the viewer of XXX movies) cannot plausibly deny that some citizens do feel emotional distress
because of what I am doing– indeed, it may be obvious that they are deeply unhappy about my movie-
watching predilections– nor can I deny that emotional distress is a kind of suffering– of pain.  After all,
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in other contexts (in tort law, for example) we readily acknowledge that the prevention of emotional or
psychic distress is a perfectly legitimate state interest.61  Or, if we want to make the point in terms of the
“preference utilitarianism” conception of harm, then it is plain that a state of affairs in which citizens like
myself can and do watch XXX films in our homes frustrates the preferences of citizens who would
prefer to exclude such materials– and practices– from the community.
In short, the straightforward utilitarian conceptions would give us no grounds for ruling out even
officious psychic distress as a form of “harm.”  Depending on the facts, this sort of harm might even
elicit the sympathies of liberal-minded citizens.  In this vein, commenting on Feinberg’s discussion of
whether a liberal polity should prohibit gladiatorial contests limited to consenting combatants who fight
to the death before consenting spectators, Richard Arneson observes that “emotional reactions to what
one’s neighbors and fellow citizens are doing can be powerful and can be virtually unavoidable for
persons who have not detached themselves from all personal concern for the quality of life in their
community.”  Arneson suggests that “we should think of citizens who would be appalled at the thought
of living in a community that tolerates Roman-style gladiatorial spectacles as harmed by the bare
knowledge that such events are occurring. . . .”62
Returning to our earlier example, however, the city council goes on to explain that by watching
XXX movies in my home I am also causing harm in another way that is more indirect but arguably more
27
Smith:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
63 Cf. Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 Am. J. Juris. 17, 18 (2000):
[T]he accumulation of private decisions to use pornography affects– sometimes
profoundly– the community as a whole.  For example, where pornography flourishes, as
it does in our own culture, it erodes important shared public understandings of sexuality
and sexual morality on which the health of the institutions of marriage and family life in any
culture depend.  This is a classic case in which the accumulation of apparently private
choices of private parties has big public consequences.
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substantial.  I insist, once again, that my conduct is purely private and hence affects no one else against
their will (except in what I will naturally regard as the officious ways just noted).  But the defenders of
the anti-obscenity restriction point out that I am being, or at least am pretending to be, sociologically
naive: I can maintain my position only by narrowly confining my field of view in an artificial and
implausible way.
More specifically, what my consenting adult friends and I do in private will surely have some
influence over the kind of people we are.  Our movie-watching habits will affect how we talk, how we
spend our time, what activities we choose to engage in and support or not to engage in and support. 
They will influence what we find interesting, and valuable, and humorous.  In this way, our conduct will
immediately influence and help to form us.  And because we interact with the community– as teachers
and lawyers and business people and consumers-- it will affect others in the community as well.63
In addition, even if for now I limit the audience for my XXX films to a few friends who are all
informed and consenting adults, it would be unrealistic to suppose that other people– our children, for
example– will not be in some measure influenced in their own thinking about what sorts of films are
available, and acceptable, and interesting.  Perhaps as they get older my own children and those of my
friends will be permitted to participate in some of our activities.  You on the other hand would prefer
that your children steer clear of such materials, but realistically it will be much more difficult for you to
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inculcate these values if many of your children’s associates and friends are participating.
Or you might fear that in a certain kind of community you yourself might come to develop a
liking for such materials, and that this would be a regrettable moral or cultural decline.  Arneson
describes this sort of concern as “self-paternalism,” and he argues that “self-paternalism is in principle a
legitimate reason for instituting criminal prohibitions.” 64
I might argue, of course, that if you prefer this level of cultural innocence you always have what
we might call “the Amish option”: you can opt out of normal society.  But you would point out that for
many people this is not in fact a viable option (remember Mosquito Coast?); and in any case, it would
be a massive imposition on your preferences to put you to that choice.  Why should you and your
friends (who are by hypothesis a sizable majority in our town) be the ones who are forced to take that
drastic course?  Why not tell me that if I really care so much about my XXX movies I always have “the
Babylon option”?  Why shouldn’t I move to some less squeamish community?  I would immediately
recognize the cost– the “harm”– that this forced choice imposes on me: but if left unregulated, the
movie-watching and related habits of people like me will impose similar harmful costs on you.
Over time, in short, what we do in private will almost certainly have a real though difficult to
measure influence on the sort of community all of us live in.  That influence seems undeniable.65  And
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campaign, for example, for programs of conservation or of state aid to the arts . . . . If we
are concerned only with the power of individuals to influence the conditions in which they
must try to thrive, any theory of self-development that forbids the majority the use of
politics and the law, even the criminal law, is at least prima facie self-defeating.
66 Robert George compares public morality to a kind of “community’s ‘moral ecology’– an
ecology as vital to the community’s well-being, and, as such, as integral to the public interest, as the
physical ecology which is protected by environmental laws.”  George, Public Morality, supra note    At
25.
67 Arneson, supra note    At 378-79.  Arneson illustrates the point using the “gladiatorial
contests” question:
I might care a lot about living in a society where recreation of the gladiatorial sort does
not occur and where I can interact with any fellow citizen or community member
without wondering whether she is a gladiatorial combat enthusiast.  I simply want to live
in a community the members of which bear allegiance to a minimal standard of civility in
recreation.  I don’t want to live in a society some of whose members offer money to
others in order to induce them to slaughter each other . . . .
Id. at 374.
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even citizens with no independent desire to be officious or to interfere in the lives of others will typically
have a very personal interest in the kind of community they (and their children) live in.66  Such desires
are deeply felt and are routinely expressed in people’s decisions about where to live.  Arneson explains
that 
[p]eople, as a matter of fact, do tend to want to live in proximity to likeminded others
and share ways of life in common with others.  The kind of life that any person wants to
live almost invariably includes relations to others beyond immediate family and close
friends.  Face-to-face arm’s-length transactions with one’s neighbors, the residents of
one’s local community, colleagues at work, and inhabitants of one’s city or county can
be important determinants of the degree to which one’s life is experienced as satisfying. 
Call such concerns “communitarian.”  The difference in price between otherwise
identical houses located in “desirable” and “undesirable” neighborhoods is one indicator
of the extent to which people care about such matters.67
Consequently, conduct that is likely over time to make a community incongruent with the values of
many of its residents, or even just less to their liking, causes these residents pain and frustrates their
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preferences: such conduct undeniably “harms” them in the familiar utilitarian senses.
So what should we conclude from this brief recitation of the utilitarian harms caused even by my
private viewing of XXX films?  Citizens who favor the sort of community that the obscenity law is
calculated to promote will likely argue that the law should be enforced against me.  And, crucially, in
taking this position they need not question or depart from the harm principle; they may on the contrary
insist on the principle, pointing out how my conduct produces the harms discussed above (and perhaps
others68).
In the abstract, though, we can hardly determine whether the moral majoritarians’ favored
conclusion is the right one.  It might be that on balance, the harms I am indirectly causing by watching
XXX movies are far less than the harms that the community would cause me by restricting my
freedom– or than the harms and risks to the members of the community in general (including those who
have no interest in pornographic films) from a government that assumes the authority to regulate this sort
of “private” behavior.69  What we can confidently conclude is simply that the harm principle as we
have thus far understood it is not helpful in deciding between my favored state of affairs and yours.
If harm is understood in utilitarian terms, in short, then once again my conduct (or any conduct
that members of the community might in fact want to restrict) does cause harm, and the harm principle
accordingly renders legitimate (though not necessarily prudent or expedient) public regulation of that
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conduct.  This is an obvious point, actually, and thoughtful proponents of Millian positions typically do
not deny it.70  I have nonetheless belabored the point, because I think a clear appreciation of the
problem helps us to perceive the “confession and avoidance” strategies to which Millians have typically
resorted, and which we will consider momentarily.
What is the significance, we might ask, of the conclusion that the harm principle understood in
straightforward utilitarian terms proves useless in defending liberty?  One lesson that we might be
tempted to draw on first thought (and, I will argue, that we ought to draw on third thought) is that for all
of its initial appeal, the harm principle is after all not helpful in answering the question of the legitimate
limits of government authority over individuals.  The path Mill pointed us to looked promising, but it
turned out to be a dead end.  Harm, of course, still is and always will be a crucial consideration in
evaluating governmental decisions, including decisions to restrict liberty; but the harm principle– the
“very simple principle” that was supposed to be “entitled to govern absolutely . . . the dealings of
society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control”– proves upon examination to be of no
use for its designated purpose.
B. Reining in “Harm”: the Technical and Normative Approach
Understandably, Mill and his followers have been reluctant to draw that lesson.  And indeed,
given the almost irresistible allure of the harm principle, discussed earlier, it would seem almost tragic to
have to discard the principle as useless.  So instead, in a quick stipulation, Millian liberals typically
acknowledge the difficulties just discussed but treat these difficulties as a warrant not for abandoning
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the harm principle, but rather for rejecting utilitarian or subjective conceptions of harm.71  They then
adopt either or both of two strategies.  The primary strategy has been to define “harm” in narrower,
more technical terms.  A secondary strategy has been to propose maxims or principles for prioritizing
harms and interests.  We will consider these strategies in turn.
Under the first strategy, not every reported injury (however real the injury and sincere the
report) will automatically qualify as a “harm.”  That conclusion, rather, must be the result of a more
theoretical reflection.  Perhaps the two leading proponents of the harm principle– Mill and Feinberg–
both take this course.
1.  The narrowing of “harm”– Mill
Consider what Mill himself does with the concept of “harm.”  Almost immediately after
announcing the harm principle, Mill asserts that he “regard[s] utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions,” and this assertion might lead us to think that he understands “harm” in something like the
straightforward utilitarian senses just discussed.  But in the same sentence he disabuses us of this idea. 
“Utility” is ultimate, but “it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded in the permanent interests of
man as a progressive being.”72  So evidently the frustration of more temporary interests, or of interests
not associated with “progressive” conceptions of humanity, will not count as harm.
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These suggestions are somewhat obscure, to be sure.  But as the essay proceeds Mill gives at
least glimpses of his “progressive” view of what a good life and a good society would be.  And his
conception of what should be regarded as “harm” is intimately tied to those views.  Thus, in a chapter
on freedom of thought and expression, Mill emphasizes the value of lively, independent thought.73 
Later, though, he concedes– or rather vigorously insists– that very few persons are actually capable of
this sort of thought: most people are mired in “collective mediocrity.”  Those of us so mired might be
tempted to conclude that lively thought is not so important for us after all; but this is not Mill’s
conclusion.  He argues, rather, that humanity achieves its highest status and receives its general
benefactors in a few “[p]ersons of genius”– the “highly instructed One or Few.”74  “I insist thus
emphatically,” Mill says, “on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself
freely both in thought and practice . . . “75
Other Millian values emerge as the essay proceeds.  Mill places great value on “Individuality”;
his use of the upper case conveys the emphasis.  He praises whatever causes “human beings [to]
become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation.”76  He finds a rich diversity in ways of life highly
appealing.77  “Originality” is to be prized.78  More generally, Mill yearns for strength and intensity (at
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least in the intellectual realm) over moderation and calm– for “great energies,” “vigorous reason,”
“strong feelings controlled by a conscientious will.”79
For Mill, these values determine the meaning of “harm.”  Contrary to what his avowed
utilitarianism might lead one to expect, “mere displeasure” is not necessarily a harm at all.80  But
conduct or restrictions that impair lively thought or originality or individuality or nobility or beauty are
harms.
Later in his essay Mill introduces, almost as an afterthought, another drastic limitation on what
counts as “harm.”   The conduct that society can expect of us, Mill remarks in what is offered as a sort
of summary of the preceding discussion, consists “in not injuring the interests of one another;”– now the
crucial qualification-- “or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit
understanding, ought to be considered as rights . . . .”81  Injury to others’ interests will not count as
cognizable “harm,” it seems, unless those interests are of the type to be regarded as “rights.”82 
Consequently, a person’s conduct may be “hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their
welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights”: such hurtful (but not
“harmful,” in Mill’s increasingly rarified sense) conduct may be “punished by opinion, though not by
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law.”83 
This limitation of “harm” to injuries inflicted on interests protected as “rights” seems at once
sensible, even inevitable, and also deeply problematic.  It is obvious, Mill and his followers might point
out, that not all injuries to all interests can justify legal restrictions.  Suppose my business (in which I
surely have an “interest”) suffers because you start an entirely legitimate competing business that drives
me into bankruptcy: should I be able to say that you “harmed” me, and hence that your business should
be prohibited?84  Even so, by limiting harms to injuries to “rights” Mill drastically undermines the
ostensible simplicity of the harm principle.85  He also severs “harm” from what it would mean in
ordinary understanding, in which it would seem a kind of double-talk to distinguish “harming” from
“hurting.”  (“True, I promised to do nothing that would harm your baby.  But I didn’t ‘harm’ her; I only
‘hurt’ her.”)
2. The narrowing of “harm” – Feinberg
In attempting to salvage the harm principle for liberal purposes, Joel Feinberg remodels the
concept of “harm” in ways that directly parallel Mill’s qualifications (though Feinberg is more careful
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Physical pains include pangs, twinges, aches, stabs, stitches, cricks, and throbs, as
caused by cuts, bruises, sores, infections, muscle spasms, over-dilated or contracted
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36
and deliberate in his fashioning of the concept).  More clearly than Mill, Feinberg disavows standard or
Benthamite utilitarianism, noting that within a utilitarian framework the distinction between “harms” and
“moral evil” would disappear.86  Feinberg also explicitly acknowledges that “harm” as he uses the term
will not correspond exactly to ordinary usage, and that there will accordingly be “clear examples of
harm as the term is used in ordinary language” that will not count as harms within his own theoretical
framework.87  More specifically, Feinberg defends two limitations that operate to exclude numerous
injuries that people might ordinarily think of as “harm” from qualifying as the sort of harm that justifies
legal coercion.
First, Feinberg says that “harm” consists of a “thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an
interest.”  An “interest,” in turn, is something in which a person has a “stake.”88  These terms are
opaque, but Feinberg attempts to clarify them; in doing so he emphasizes distinctions between “harms”
on the one hand and the “[u]nhappy but not necessarily harmful experiences” that he describes as mere
“hurts” and “offenses” on the other.89  Feinberg offers a lengthy and macabre list of nonharmful “hurts”90
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but explains that these are not “harms” because “[t]here is no interest in not being hurt as such, though
certainly we all want to escape being hurt, and the absence of pain is something on which we all place a
considerable value.”91
The rejection of subjective pain or subjective preferences as the criteria of harm is explicit here;
normative judgments (as opposed to victims’ subjective judgments) are plainly at work. 92  But the
second limit Feinberg places on what can count as a “harm” is even more overtly normative in nature. 
Like Mill, Feinberg makes “harm” dependent not only on “interests” but also on pre-existing “rights.” 
Thus, he argues that a setback even to what is admittedly an “interest” does not count as a “harm”
unless it is wrongfully inflicted– which is to say that it is inflicted in violation of a right.
To say that A has harmed B in this sense is to say much the same thing as that A has
wronged B, or treated him unjustly.  One person wrongs another when his indefensible
(unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s right . . . .93
So it turns out that only a carefully delimited subset of the universe of injury can support “harm”
in Feinberg’s scheme.  The limitations on what can count as “harm” are so restrictive that Feinberg is
pushed to acknowledge various other kinds of “harmless” misfortunes-- or of what Feinberg himself
calls “evils.”  We have already noted two such evils-- “hurts” and “offenses.”  But in the final volume of
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his project Feinberg goes on to offer an elaborate taxonomy of “evils.”94  On the most general level he
distinguishes between what he calls “theological evils” (such as natural disasters and “killer diseases”)
and “legislative evils,” which are the result of human action.95  Subdividing the latter category, he
describes “grievance evils”– “harms” belong in this subcategory-- and “non-grievance evils.”  Among
the latter are “free floating” evils, which are so named because they “‘float free’ of [human] interests,
needs, and desires.”96
Unlike Mill, Feinberg does not contend that the harm principle is the only possible justification
for restrictions on liberty.97  He allows for coercion to prevent some types of offensive conduct.98 
More generally, he concedes that “[s]ince evils are by definition something to be regretted and
prevented when possible, it seems to follow that the prevention of an evil, any evil, is always a reason
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of some relevance, however slight, in support of a criminal prohibition.”  But Feinberg minimizes this
relaxation of the harm principle by arguing that evils other than “harm” (and to a limited extent
“offense”) will rarely justify curtailing liberty.  “[T]he liberal . . . can grant . . . that legal moralism is
technically correct, or correct in the abstract, but insist that, in fact, non-grievance evils can never (or
hardly ever) have enough weight to justify the invasion of personal autonomy.”99
In sum, both Mill and Feinberg (the author and the most careful expositor, respectively, of the
harm principle) self-consciously depart from conventional or generic usages and from subject-based
senses of “harm.”  Instead, they define the concept in narrower, theory-driven senses that exclude many
injuries that people would ordinarily regard as “harms.”  In addition, they import an element of law or
political morality into the concept, so that injuries that do not invade “rights” or are not “wrongfully”
inflicted do not count as “harms.”  These qualifications are necessary, as they argue, if the harm
principle is to serve the liberal purposes for which it was devised.
The refinements seem to have generated admiration among academic critics.100  And the
admiration is understandable: an intricate analysis such as Feinberg’s, piling nice distinction on
distinction and taxonomy on taxonomy, is surely more impressive than a crude or undifferentiated notion
that merely defers to the unanalyzed notions of often unreflective persons, accepting that if someone’s
subjective desires or preferences have been frustrated she has ipso facto been harmed.  Nonetheless,
by reshaping the notion of “harm” and wrenching it away from its more natural or ordinary meanings,
the liberal proponents of the harm principle seriously undermine the usefulness– and the integrity– of
40




C. Harm to Discourse
Liberal theorists, we have seen, depart from conventional usage and subjective reports and
instead refine the notion of “harm” into a term of art.  On first impression, it is hard to fault them for this. 
Doesn’t careful consideration of an issue often require us to try to achieve more precision in our basic
terms than those terms would have in ordinary conversation?  Won’t the effort to obtain such precision
necessarily cause our meanings to depart from less disciplined everyday usages?
Nonetheless, refinements of the notion of “harm” introduce serious mischief into political and
legal discourse.  We can notice some of these problems, beginning with the less grave and proceeding
to the more serious.
           1.  Loss of simplicity
Most obviously, the numerous refinements and qualifications introduced by proponents of the
harm principle deprive the principle of the simplicity that Mill attributed to it.  On its face the principle is
still simple– government can restrict liberty only to prevent “harm”– but since “harm” itself is not a
simple fact but rather the conclusion of a controversial and complex normative reflection, the simplicity
is illusory.  It is as if someone were to say that there is one “simple moral principle” that can readily be
applied to resolve all moral questions and conflicts: “Do good and avoid evil.”  Okay, but . . . .
It may be, of course, that such matters are simply not amenable to simple propositions and nice
generalizations.  Nonetheless, as we have seen, its apparent simplicity is one of the harm principle’s
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major attractions.   It is part of what makes the principle seem suitable for judicial use; and in different
ways the principle’s apparent simplicity is also a major recommendation for its use in academic contexts
and in everyday conversations.101  By depriving the principle of this attractive feature, liberal refinements
make it much less useful than it at first appears.
2.  Confusion
A second and closely related drawback of the Millians’ technical conceptions of “harm” is that
these conceptions, though attempting to make the concept of “harm” more precise, risk promoting
confusion in discussions of the issues to which the harm principle is addressed.  Without great care,
discussants are likely use the term “harm” sometimes in the complex and specialized senses elaborated
by thinkers like Mill and Feinberg and at other times in the more generic senses of the term.  
It might seem that this is a risk that could be avoided simply by paying careful attention to how
the term is being used.  Perhaps-- but such attentiveness is more easily preached than practiced.  In
everyday conversations, it would be remarkable if the risks of confusion could be avoided.  And as we
will see, this risk is often realized in academic discussions as well, even in the written work of careful
theorists like Feinberg.
3. Circularity
A somewhat different or at least more specific danger is that of circularity.   Liberals and others
use the harm principle to argue for their favored positions on questions of individual freedom, often in
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the context of specific controversies over obscenity, regulation of sexual conduct, abortion, or similar
issues.  But, reversing directions, they also use their favored positions on issues of individual liberty to
argue for understanding “harm” in particular ways– and for excluding from the category of “harm”
injuries that are in fact harmful in any ordinary sense not skewed to satisfy the demands of a particular
theory or to reach (or avoid) particular favored (or disfavored) conclusions.  So it seems that premises
and conclusions are constantly switching places.  A conclusion (“no regulation of . . . “) is said to be
justified because it follows from the premise (the harm principle).  But a contested interpretation of the
premise (subjective injuries x, y, and z should not be counted as “harms”) is justified because it is
necessary to support the preferred conclusion.
Thus, we have already noted that although injuries in the utilitarian senses are in fact “harms” in
any ordinary or subjective sense of the term– I do “harm” you by inflicting pain on you, or by frustrating
your preferences– proponents of the harm principle peremptorily dismiss these senses of the term. 
They do so quite simply and unapologetically because, so construed, the harm principle would permit
rampant limitations of freedom that liberals oppose.102
We have also noticed that both Mill and Feinberg are willing to count as “harms” only injuries
to interests protected by “rights.”  But what “rights” we have against governmental interference with our
liberty was precisely the question– or at least one way of stating the question– that the harm principle
was supposed to help us answer.  So it seems that we cannot know whether something counts as a
“harm” unless we know what “rights” people have, and we cannot know what “rights” we have unless
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we know what will count as “harm.”
 Feinberg notices, and briefly responds to, this apparent circularity.103  He acknowledges that
the circularity is vitiating if the rights invoked to classify which interests can be the subject of “harm” are
legal rights, but he argues that the circularity can be avoided by specifying that the rights used to
classify interests are “moral rights merely.” 104  This suggestion might seem to demote the harm
principle into a minor corollary of some larger doctrine of moral or “natural rights,” but Feinberg
eschews any such doctrine.  Instead, he tries to explicate the notion of “moral rights” by asserting that
“any indefensible invasion of another’s interest (excepting of course the sick and wicked ones) is a
wrong,” and hence an infringement of a “moral right.”105  But far from resolving the circularity, this
response merely complicates the problem with additional normative questions.  Which among the
interests people think they have are genuine and valid, as opposed to “sick and wicked”? And how do
we know which invasions of interests are “indefensible.”  It seemed that these were the sorts of
questions that the harm principle was supposed to help us answer (or deflect), but it turns out that we
cannot even use the principle unless we already have answers to these questions.
In sum, it seems that in many ostensible applications of the harm principle, the conclusion is
justifying the premise, not vice versa.  Indeed, Feinberg is sometimes endearingly candid as he reshapes
his harm principle to support conclusions he favors in advance.  In the final volume of his series, he
considers a situation much like our earlier example of a highly moralistic community in which a few
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citizens want to watch pornographic movies at home.106  Feinberg concedes (revealingly?) that when he
wrote his first volume, Harm to Others, it had not occurred to him that moralistic citizens might seek to
justify a restriction by asserting-- quite plausibly, as he now admits-- that they are harmed by their
neighbors’ practice because “their paramount interest in living in a community of a certain sort has
definitely been set back.”107  “If that had occurred to me in time,” he forthrightly acknowledges, “I no
doubt would have tried to control the damage to my liberalism by adding another ‘mediating maxim for
the application of the harm principle,’ one which would place constraints on the way appeals to harm
prevention can be made in those quite common circumstances in which interests are opposed.”108 
Having noticed the difficulty, Feinberg then goes on to propose just such a further refinement– one
favoring “personal” interests over “external” ones.109
The point is not that there is anything necessarily unseemly about revising one’s premises to
avoid untenable conclusions– some such back-and-forth revising is arguably a part of the “reflective
equilibrium” involved in modern normative thinking generally– and indeed Feinberg’s candor in the
matter is impressive.  Nor need we consider here whether his distinction between “personal” and
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“external” interests succeeds in persuasively supporting Feinberg’s preferred conclusion.110  The point
for now is simply that when “harm” is severed from its conventional and more straightforward meanings,
the relation between ostensible premise and ostensible conclusion is placed in doubt.  It is hard to know
whether the premise is carrying the conclusion or the conclusion is carrying the premise.
4. Free (or heavily subsidized) riding
But this is still not the most serious objection provoked by the more crafted definitions of harm
to which Mill and his followers have been forced to resort.  The greatest problem is that the possibilities
of confusion and equivocation and circularity created by different meanings of “harm” permit liberal
thinkers to “free ride” on the irresistible appeal of the harm principle in its more ordinary or generic
senses.  A favored conclusion thus becomes dependent on a sort of parasitism, and is deprived of the
benefit of being tested and assessed on its own merits– of (to borrow a phrase) “fighting for its
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existence” and of being “fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed.”111
Such “free riding” is possible because, as we have seen, in its ordinary sense the harm principle
states what seems to be almost a self-evident normative truth– one that resonates both with familiar
intuitions and popular adages and with more developed theories of legitimate government.  If I want to
do something, and if it doesn’t harm anyone, what good reason does the government have to stop me? 
We have noticed how this intuition fits with what we have called the “somebody else’s nose” and
“nobody else’s business” adages.  In everyday conversation (and also, as we will shortly see, in liberal
theory) the point is often made in terms of a “doesn’t affect” claim: if my conduct “doesn’t affect”
anyone else, then government should leave me alone.
Once “harm” has been redefined in a more technical and much narrower sense, however,
proponents of the harm principle forfeit their claim to rely on these familiar intuitions.  If what I am doing
“hurts” and “offends” others, and if it causes them pain and frustrates their preferences, then perhaps I
should still be allowed to do it: but I can hardly claim in good faith that the reason I should be allowed
to do it is that my conduct doesn’t “affect” them.  What I want to do may not cause harm in the narrow,
artificial senses elaborated by Mill and Feinberg, but it surely does “affect” others– detrimentally, and
perhaps quite powerfully.
By rights, then, proponents of the harm principle ought to forego any reliance on the “doesn’t
affect” appeal (and on the related intuitions).   But the multiple meanings of “harm” would make it
difficult to exclude any such appeal even if liberal thinkers wanted to earn their own way.  And in any
case, it seems they are not inclined to be so scrupulous.  On the contrary, a close reading of their
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arguments suggests that they pervasively, even flagrantly, exploit the equivocation involved in “harm” to
piggyback their arguments and conclusions onto the more conventional or straightforward senses of
“harm” that they elsewhere disavow.
Mill as free rider.  Thus, in the same paragraph in which he introduces the harm principle, Mill
gives it a powerful rhetorical boost by asserting that an individual’s freedom should be respected in that
part of his conduct “which merely concerns himself.”112  This language is repeated throughout the
essay.113  Almost as numbingly frequent is an appeal framed in “not affecting” language.  A person
should be free in “conduct which affects only himself . . . .”114  He should not be “restrained in things not
affecting [others’] good.”115  Society has no coercive jurisdiction over a man in “conduct which does
not affect the interests of others in their relation to him.”116  Or the protection of the principle may be
said to cover the individual’s “judgment and purposes in what only regards himself.”117
The effect of these recurring appeals is to create a depiction of the sort of regulation that Mill is
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resisting (and that an overbearing “society” is ostensibly eager to impose) as almost wholly gratuitous–
an officious effort to interfere in and curtail conduct which simply does not “concern,” “affect,” or
“regard” anyone other than the actor.  Little wonder that such gratuitous interference would provoke
Mill’s opposition: who other than the most insensitive meddler would not be indignant at such gratuitous
interference?118
A moderately careful reading of Mill’s essay shows, of course, that this indignation is
misinformed, because the crucial terms– “concern,” “affect,” “regard”– are actually being used in
narrow and highly artificial senses.  As Mill quietly acknowledges, the same conduct that in his special
usage does not “affect” or “concern” other people may very well be “hurtful” to them, and may have a
powerful detrimental impact on “interests” of theirs that (unfortunately for them) do not rise to the level
of “rights.”  Viewed in this light, Mill’s position seems much more fragile.  Is it so obvious that
individuals have an “absolute” right to do things that are “hurtful” to others so long as they do not
“harm” others in Mill’s special and convoluted sense, and that society has no right to restrain such
“hurtful” conduct?  How much of the appeal of Mill’s position is owed to free or at least subsidized
riding– to equivocations involving terms such as “harm,” “concern,” and “affect”?
Feinberg as free rider.  As noted, Joel Feinberg is more deliberate in his analysis and his use
of terms.  Nonetheless, Feinberg does not forbear from exploiting the rhetorical possibilities of
equivocating about the meaning of “harm.” 
For instance, we have earlier noted that persons who value a particular kind of community or
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121 See supra notes
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culture might plausibly argue that they do in fact suffer “harm” from actions that undermine that
community or culture.  (Whether such harm justifies restrictions on such actions is, once again, a
different and more complicated question.)  Although at times Feinberg appears to concede the point,119
however, in his more elaborate taxonomy this sort of injury is typically classified as an “evil” but not a
“harm.”  But in arguing passionately that no one’s liberty should be restricted to prevent this kind of
evil, Feinberg seemingly makes at least tacit but powerful use of the more generic sense of “harm.”
So he protests that restrictions aimed at protecting community character, by limiting the
freedom of some individuals, would inflict “palpable harms” merely to avoid “states of affairs that harm
no one.”120  Such an exchange– of “palpable harms” for the cessation of harmless conduct– seems
manifestly unreasonable, to be sure.  But then of course it is only in Feinberg’s highly artificial sense of
“harm” that the loss of a kind of valued culture or community “harm[s] no one”: in any less
gerrymandered sense of the term such a loss might be viewed as a very serious harm.121 
It is likewise wrong, Feinberg insists, “[i]f I am forbidden on pain of criminal punishment and
public humiliation from acting as I prefer in ways that harm no one . . . .”122  Same response.  And
again: “The free-floating evils [including merely moral wrongs] do not hurt anybody; they cause no
injury, offense, or distress. . . .  To prevent them with the iron fist of legal coercion would be to impose
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126 Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 927, 939 (1999).  See also
Robert P. George, Moralistic Liberalism and Legal Moralism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1415, 1416-17 (1990)
(review essay):
[Feinberg] recognizes that “the liberal position” on the moral limits of the criminal law is
not self-evidently true, and that its truth must therefore be established by argument. 
Despite this recognition, however, he offers little direct or affirmative argument to
establish its truth.  His method is one of dialectical, rather than direct, argumentation.
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suffering and injury for the sake of no one’s good at all.”123  And yet again: “[I]t is no reason
whatever to restrict A’s behavior simply because B disapproves of it, in the absence of harm or
offense.”124  The same response applies: these protests seem powerful and persuasive, but their power
is dependent on the more subjective and generic senses of harm.  Conversely, if we keep constantly in
view that Feinberg is using “harm” in a “special narrow sense”125 and that in fact the behavior he wants
to immunize does cause harm in more ordinary senses, his pleas lose much of their force. 
Indeed, it is at least arguable that Feinberg quietly depends on free riding as the major source of
support for his harm principle generally.  In a perceptive and in some respects admiring review of
Feinberg’s opus, Gerald Dworkin attempts to clarify just what the harm principle as advocated by
Feinberg entails.  Having done so, Dworkin asks, “What is the argument for it?”  The response is
sobering: “In truth, I cannot find a clear argument in Feinberg.”126  So Dworkin comments wryly that
“[a]s Bertrand Russell observed with respect to logical matters, postulation has all ‘the advantages of
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127 Dworkin, supra note    at 946.  James Stephen made a similar complaint about Mill.  “There
is hardly anything in [Mill’s] whole essay which can properly be called proof as distinguished from
enunciation or assertion of the general principles quoted.”  Stephen, supra note    At 8.
128 See supra note
129 Perhaps this assessment understates the justification Feinberg offers.  It is likely true, as
Feinberg suggests, that not many people (liberal or otherwise) will question the harm principle as a
justification for restricting harmful conduct, as opposed to a limitation on government power. 
Not many will deny, that is, that government can regulate to prevent the kinds of injuries he counts as
“harms”: the controversial question, it seems, is whether preventing harm so understood is the only or
exclusive rationale that justifies legal coercion.  (As noted, Feinberg argues that coercion is sometimes
justified to prevent “offense” as well as “harm.”) Hence, Feinberg’s more complete argument for the
limited harm principle occurs not so much in his discussion of the principle itself as in his criticism of
other possible rationales– in particular, morality-based rationales– for coercion.  Unfortunately, that
criticism depends heavily on the equivocations just noted.
130 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Law of Peoples 131, 132
(noting, with respect to those with a “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics,” that “[p]olitical
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theft over honest toil.’”127
An inspection provides support for Dworkin’s judgment.  The explication of the harm principle
is the task primarily of Feinberg’s first volume.  That book leads off with discussions of various senses
of harm.  It proceeds to introduce some intricate refinements into the concept– we have noticed a few
of them– and then to apply the concept as refined in imaginative and provocative ways to a host of
particular problems.  It is not hard to understand why the book has generated the almost extravagant
praise that it along with its sequels has received.128  And yet . . . if one looks for any sustained
justification of the harm principle as a limitation on government, one will search the book in vain.129 
Perhaps it seemed that no justification was needed.  Perhaps Feinberg imagined himself, as
liberal theorists sometimes self-consciously do,  to be engaged in a conversation with people who
already share his basic assumptions and commitments,130 so that only refinements, not full-
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liberalism does not engage those who think in this way”); id. at 178 (“They assert that the religiously
true, or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable.  We simply say that such a doctrine
is politically unreasonable.  Within political liberalism nothing more need be said.”). 
131 Feinberg indicates early on that he hopes “to persuade the skeptical reader that liberalism is
true doctrine.”  Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note    at 15.  This ambition might suggest that he is
speaking at least in part to people who do not already share his liberal assumptions.  Shortly thereafter,
however, he explains that his methodology relies on the “coherence” or “ad hominem” method, which
“presupposes a great deal of common ground between arguer and addressee (reader) to begin with.” 
Id. at 18.  Perhaps the clearest indication of intention explains that “I hope to convince many who share
my basic ideals and attitudinal outlook also to share less obvious specific judgments about the particular
subject matter of the book.”  Id. at 19.  Perhaps that somewhat select audience is presumed to accept
in advance the harm principle more or less (though not completely) as Feinberg presents it?
132 Id. at 187.
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scale defenses, were needed.131
Or perhaps the efficacy of the principle just seemed self-evident.  Thus, after presenting a
number of potentially controversial refinements in and applications of the harm principle, Feinberg
comments sanguinely that “[a]s it has been formulated here, the harm-to-others principle is virtually
beyond controversy.”132  His confidence at this point seems remarkable.  It may be true, as discussed
earlier, that the core idea contained in the harm principle is a virtual truism.  Unfortunately, the truism
and Feinberg, though sharing the term “harm,” are not talking about the same thing. 
D. Prioritizing Harms?
The preceding discussion has suggested that the harm principle cannot perform the function for
which it is offered: it cannot serve as a device for delineating the domain of “liberty of action,” or the
realm within which “power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
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against his will.”133  Unless the notion of “harm” is gerrymandered to support the limits on coercion that
the theorist already favors on other grounds, the natural conclusion will be that every action causes
harm, and hence that every action is subject to governmental regulation.
Liberal theorists may confess the point but seek to avoid the conclusion.  The primary
avoidance strategy, as we have seen, is to rig the notion of “harm” so as to justify the desired
conclusions: but that tactic provokes the objections just discussed.  A different avoidance strategy
suggests that the basic harm principle needs to be “supplemented” by further guidelines or maxims that
will help government to navigate its way through the broad ocean of diverse and often conflicting
concerns that the theorist is willing to count as “harms.”
Thus, even after refining the harm principle for almost 200 pages, Feinberg acknowledges that
“[w]hatever this innocuous statement of the harm principle gains in plausibility, . . . it loses in practical
utility as a guide to legislative decisions.”
Solutions to these [practical] problems cannot be provided by the harm principle in its
simply stated form [sic!], but absolutely require the help of supplementary principles,
some of which represent controversial moral decisions and maxims of justice.134
Feinberg then goes on to suggest a number of such “principles” and “maxims” that will help legislators
balance and weigh the various competing interests that real-world legislative decisions must confront.
Some of these maxims and guidelines are controversial, as Feinberg acknowledges.  As noted,
for example, his (and other liberals’) argument that “personal” interests should usually be given priority
over “external” interests– such as interests in living a particular kind of culture or community– asserts a
54
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 17 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art17
135 See supra notes     And accompanying text.  As noted, the “personal/external” guideline was
not part of Feinberg’s original set of maxims, but was developed later in response to perceived
difficulties.
136 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note   at 204 (emphasis added).  See generally id. at 188-
93.
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distinction that is conceptually dubious and highly contestable as a normative matter.135  By contrast,
other proposed guidelines seem uncontroversially sound– almost platitudinous.  Who will quarrel with
the suggestion that in making policy choices, “we should protect an interest that is certain to be
harmed in preference to one whose liability to harm is only conjectural, other things being equal”“
Does anyone doubt that “we should deem it more important to prevent the total thwarting of one
interest than the mere invasion to some small degree of another interest, other things being equal”?136  
Whether or not the particular maxims and trade-offs proposed by Feinberg or other theorists
are attractive, however, the crucial point is that these suggestions are no longer in service of the
jurisdictional purpose for which the harm principle is offered.  After all, the idea that governments
should adopt laws and policies to reduce harm is hardly either a liberal or a modern idea: it is a point so
obvious that it could scarcely be doubted by anyone of any political persuasion.  Preventing crime and
violence, protecting property in whatever form a particular regime recognizes it: these are the most
basic functions that any government performs.  It seems equally obvious and elementary that since
people’s interests sometimes conflict, what one person wants to have or do will sometimes collide with
what other people want to have or do; so governments will have to assess and compare different sorts
of harms that are the subject of their laws and policies.   Liberal theorists like Mill or Feinberg may have
useful suggestions about how these comparisons and assessments should be made, of course, and they
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determine the relative importance of harms.  Once a non-trivial harm argument has been made, the
harm principle itself offers no further guidance.”).
139 Mill, supra note   at 13, 76.
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will surely want the assessments to be made in way congenial to liberal or “progressive” values.  But
this is not the sort of problem for which the harm principle has been offered.
That principle was and is held out, rather, as a device for delineating a realm within which the
government has “no business.”137  In other words, the harm principle seeks to establish the outer
boundaries of the coercive use of law, not to tell government how to make decisions within those
boundaries.  As noted earlier, the harm principle was and is offered as a principle of “legitimacy,” or of
proper jurisdiction, as distinct from the domain of prudential judgment covering matters over which
government does have jurisdiction.  Conversely, maxims telling government how to balance or rank
harms are addressed more to questions arising in the latter domain.  Such maxims may be perfectly
sensible, but it is misleading to present them as if they were supplements to or applications of the harm
principle. 138 
 As we have seen, Mill was explicit about the principle’s jurisdictional or “legitimacy”
purpose.139  Likewise, at the beginning of his project Feinberg carefully and explicitly distinguishes
between the questions of “legitimacy,” on the one hand, and of what we might call “policy” or prudential
legislative judgments on the other; and he explains that his purpose is to address the first of these
questions, not the second.
It is not my purpose to try to specify what such a [legislative] body would choose to
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include in its ideally wise and useful penal code, but rather what it may include, if it
chooses, within the limits that morality places on its legislative decisions.  This four-
volume work, then, . . . attempts to provide a coherent and plausible set of moral
principles to guide the legislator by locating the moral constraints that limit his options. 
The book will not consider the further questions of cost-benefit analysis that must
guide the legislator in his choices among those alternatives that do fall within the
recommended moral limits.  Within the proper limits the legislator must consider the
social utility of his various opinions, their likely effects on various private and public
interests, constituent desires and pressures, even the demands of “politics” in a narrow
sense (log-rolling, compromising, political debt-paying, etc.).  Our primary question,
however, is not one about social utility and practical wisdom.  I do not offer
suggestions here about what it would be “a good idea” to legislate within the
scope of what may be legislated.  This book is a quest not for useful policies but for
valid principles.140
Later in the book, though, in offering suggestions and guidelines for the task of “Comparing and
Assessing Harms,”141 Feinberg effectively does just what he says he would not do: he addresses the
question of how government should operate within the domain in which the harm principle would allow
that regulation is legitimate.  Indeed, his maxims are self-consciously addressed to “the legislative
interest-balancer”142 in an effort to guide judgment in matters over which the legislature is assumed to
have jurisdiction, including matters such as setting the minimum drinking age, regulating competition,
setting up licensing schemes, and reducing environmental pollution.143
There is nothing wrong, probably, with an author deciding mid-course to do more than he
initially set out to do– to address questions he said he would not address.  But it is misleading to
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suggest, as Feinberg does, that these various maxims and guidelines are “supplementing” the harm
principle,144 or are somehow strengthening it or making it more useable or defensible for its own distinct
purpose.  In fact, the suggestions for “comparing and assessing harms” are performing a function
altogether different than the one for which the harm principle is offered– a function for which the harm
principle is, by Feinberg’s admission, of no use145– and they do nothing to make the harm principle
more serviceable for its own function.
Indeed, by first insisting on but later smudging and ignoring the distinction between legitimacy
and prudence, Feinberg in effect achieves another unearned rhetorical subsidy for his views.  Offering
 what are plainly cost-benefit and prudential guidelines as if they were
supplementing and elaborating a principle of legitimate jurisdiction, Feinberg manages tacitly to
upgrade his prudential objections against particular kinds of regulation into claims that such regulations
are “illegitimate,” or beyond government’s proper jurisdiction.  This way of packaging the analysis may
give it more rhetorical force, especially in judicial contexts in which courts are commonly supposed to
defer to other branches’ prudential judgments but also to make sure that other branches act only for
“legitimate” objectives.146  By blurring his own distinction, therefore, Feinberg promotes his analysis into
something that is potentially cognizable in the courts.  But the promotion is the product of an illicit
58




III. Conclusion: Retiring the Harm Principle
We have seen that if “harm” is understood in generic and subjective senses (as in the utilitarian
conceptions of harm), the harm principle is attractive or even irresistible– and also useless.  It is useless
because every sort of conduct that anyone wants to restrict will cause harm, and hence will fall within
government’s coercive jurisdiction.  To avoid this conclusion, liberal theorists resort to equivocations. 
Primarily, while clinging to and exploiting ordinary and generic senses of “harm” for persuasive
purposes, they also try to define “harm” in more narrow, technical, and normative senses consistent
with the more particular conclusions they favor.
Normative and technical approaches make “harm” into a term of art, with conclusions about
whether an injury counts as cognizable harm depending not on empirical observation (Do people
sincerely think and report that they’ve been injured or set back by ____?) but rather on the reflective
application of political and moral theory.  But once we recognize that “harm” is being used as a term of
art, and that conceptions of harm are being derived from a larger vision or theory rather than vice
versa, it becomes apparent that there is no reason why anyone should object to the harm principle. 
Everyone can embrace the principle and simply count as “harms” injuries to the sorts of values or
interests for which protection would be prescribed by his or her theory of government or the good life. 
For example, if instead of Mill’s “progressive” view you hold the sort of “perfectionist” view that
teaches that moral character is essential to the good life and that government has a role in “making men
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Harm to Others, supra note    at 65-70.
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harm principle.  We must look beyond the traditional structure of the debate over the
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debates about power, autonomy, identity, human flourishing, equality, freedom and other
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Harcourt, supra note   at 183.
150 See, e.g., Hart, supra note    At 82-83.
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moral,”147 then you will naturally and logically want to recognize “moral harm.”148  Different visions or
political theories will produce different inventories of harms.  But there is no reason for anyone to
question the harm principle itself.
It follows that meaningful debates will contend not over the harm principle– or even over the
meaning of “harm,” as if that were a basic or primary question that could be addressed and answered in
its own right.  Instead, meaningful debate will contend over the larger theories or visions from which
particular understandings of “harm” are derived.149  We have seen that Mill proposed, at least in rough
sketch, a vision of the good life– one that placed preeminent value on things such as intellectual
development (especially for the few who qualify for the distinction of “genius”), individuality, diversity of
lifestyles, and beauty.  H. L. A. Hart, though following in the general utilitarian tradition, seemed less
impressed with the imperatives of “genius” and more concerned with reducing human suffering.150 
Feinberg expressly disavowed utilitarianism as a comprehensive theory and offered, albeit in piecemeal
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152 See,.e.g., Stephen, supra note    At 33 (questioning “Mr. Mill’s enthusiasm for individual
greatness” and criticizing “[t]he odd manner in which Mr. Mill worships mere variety, and confounds
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fashion, a somewhat different vision of what is good and valuable in life– with an obvious emphasis on
long-term projects and plans over passing satisfactions, and with special emphasis on personal
autonomy.151
 Any of these visions will of course be attractive to some, unattractive or perhaps even
anathema to others.152  Such disagreements can be the source and locus of fruitful discussion.  The
conclusion of this essay is simply that this is where the debate ought to be joined– in questions about the
theories or visions of the good life and the proper role of government.  Conversely, arguments for and
against “the harm principle,” or arguments that purport to derive particular conclusions from the harm
principle itself, serve only to mislead and distract.  When the often subtle values and premises of a
general theory or at least a general orientation toward life and government are squeezed into the notion
of “harm,” productive discussion becomes next to impossible.
To be sure, we can attempt to carry on discussion by using specialized and normatively laden
notions of “harm” as proxies for our more complex and encompassing views (and we do).  But it would
be less misleading to substitute some other, more transparently technical term– “legally cognizable
occurrences,” perhaps.  And notice what would happen to the basic harm principle if we made this
adjustment: it would become an empty tautology.  “One very simple principle governs the use of
coercive governmental power,” we would say– “which is that such power should be used only to
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address legally cognizable occurrences.”  Or, better yet: “Coercion should be used only to prevent the
kinds of occurrences that coercion should be used to prevent.”  Who could disagree with that?  Who
would want to disagree?
Empty tautologies can be rhetorically useful, to be sure: they can be rhetorically useful precisely
because they are substantively empty.  But they do not thereby promote clarity of thought or
discussion.  The harm principle is hollow, and our public deliberations would benefit from its retirement.
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